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ABSTRACT  
 
The Twin Peaks model of regulation brought about significant changes to South Africa’s financial 
sector landscape. The new regulatory regime sought to separate financial regulation into prudential 
regulation and market conduct regulation. One of the newly added responsibilities of the market 
conduct regulator is the regulation and supervision of banks. This effectively means that banks 
will be subjected to Treating Customers Fairly principles when interacting with the customers. 
Currently one of the key instruments influencing the bank-customer relationship is the Code of 
Banking Practice. The code applies to personal and small businesses customers. 
 
The new market conduct regulation makes it necessary to evaluate the future of the Code of 
Banking Practice. The dissertation makes an assessment of the code based on a few problematic 
areas which have been identified, namely set-off and the closing of bank accounts; in addition, the 
code will be measured against some of the findings made by the World Banking Group in the 
Retail Banks Diagnostic report. In light of the above-mentioned, this dissertation seeks to answer 
the question of whether the current Code of Banking Practice will still be relevant under the market 
conduct regime in South African. Case law and the position taken by the Ombudsman for Banking 
Services in some instances will be explored in order to answer the question posed above.  
Lastly, a comparative analysis is made between South Africa and Australia in order to assess what 
lessons could be learned from foreign jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
PROPOSAL 
  
1.1 Background  
In recent years, the South African legal system embarked on a process to revamp the regulatory 
landscape within the financial services industry. This was after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC). The 2008 GFC gave rise to a debate as to whether there should be a single regulator 
encompassing all financial regulations or whether financial regulations and supervision should be 
done by different regulators.1 As a member of Group of Twenty (G-20), South Africa has to 
implement resolutions agreed upon during the 2009 summit. South Africa embarked on a trek to 
re-evaluate financial policy, targeting areas such as the insurance industry as well as the banking 
sector industry, which includes the retirement and pension funds industry.2 
 
In 2011, the National Treasury (NT) published A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa 
Better,3 a proposal to separate prudential and market conduct regulations. The aim of the proposal 
was to introduce a shift towards a Twin Peaks4 model for financial regulation. The model sought 
to create a dedicated market conduct regulator which would regulate and supervise all financial 
institutions, including banks and further to establish a prudential regulator. The proposal describes 
the Twin Peaks approach as the “[o]ptimal means of ensuring that transparency, market integrity, 
and customer protection receive sufficient priority”. 
 
Prior to the Twin Peaks model, banks were supervised and regulated by the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) and then Financial Services Board (FSB) was responsible for regulation and 
supervision of non-banking financial institutions. The National Credit Regulator (NCR) who is 
                                                          
1  Van Niekerk and Van Heerden “Twin peaks: the role of the South African central bank in promoting and maintaining 
financial stability” 2017 THRHR 636 638. 
2  Van Niekerk and Van Heerden (n 1) 641. 
3  National Treasury “A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better” 2 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20-
%20Item%202%20A%20safer%20financial%20sector%20to%20serve%20South%20Africa%20better.pdf (02-
05-2019)).  
4  Van Niekerk and Van Heerden (n 1) 639. 
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responsible for promoting and supporting a fair, transparent, competitive and sustainable5 credit 
market continues to oversee credit providers under the Twin Peaks model. Following promulgation 
of the Financial Sector Regulation Act6 (FSR Act), two regulators were officially established, 
namely, the Prudential Authority7 (PA) and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority8 (FSCA). The 
former is responsible for the protection of financial customers against the risk of those financial 
institutions failing to meet their obligations.9 The latter has assumed additional responsibilities to 
regulate and supervise banks. There is no doubt that the banking industry is one of the most 
important in terms of contributing to the economy and the way it touches the lives of South 
Africans in different ways.10 It is envisaged that banks will, for the first time, be subjected to more 
intense and intrusive11 regulation as far as the market conduct regulation is concerned. This view 
is further supported by a proposition that market conduct oversight must be sufficiently strong to 
complement prudential regulation, particularly in the banking sector.12 The problem that banks 
may face under the market conduct regime will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
In terms of section 106(3)(c) of the FSR Act, the FSCA is empowered to make Conduct Standard 
for the fair treatment of financial customers.13 While there is no mention of the Treating Customers 
Fairly principles (TCF principles) in the FSR Act, a close examination of the provisions of the Act 
reveals that the entire TCF principles have now been embedded in the legislation. There is no 
doubt that banks will be obliged to comply with the TCF principles for the first time in history. 
                                                          
5  National Credit Act 24 of 2005 s 13(a). 
6  9 of 2017. 
7  (n 6) s 32(1). 
8  (n 6) s 56(1). 
9  (n 6) s 33(c). 
10 Bank enquiry – Report to the Competition Commissioner by the Enquiry Panel 8 
(https://www.southafrica.to/Banks/news/2008/competition-commission-banking-enquiry.pdf (02-05-2019)). 
11 National Treasury “A Draft Market Conduct Policy Framework for South Africa” 8 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%20the%20
Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20WithAp6.pdf(19-04-
2019)). 
12 Schmulow “Retail Market conducts reforms in South Africa under Twin Peaks” 2017 Law and Financial Markets 
Review 163. 
13 (n 6) s 106(3)(c). 
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The Code of Banking Practice (CBP)14 is regarded as an important influence on modern banks’ 
customer relationships in South Africa. The CBP is a voluntary code that sets out the minimum 
standards for service and conduct that customers should expect from banks with regard to the 
services and products it offers.15 The CBP provides for a variety of aspects germane to the banker-
client relationship.16 One of the most attractive provisions in the CBP is the preamble to the code 
which states that “our relationship with you (customer) will be guided by four key principles, 
namely fairness, transparency, accountability and reliability”.17 
 
The CBP sets minimum standards that banks need to comply with when dealing with customers.18 
The CBP contains interesting provisions which echo the TCF principles. Despite the customer-
oriented approach that has been incorporated into the CBP, there are numerous instances where 
the CBP has failed to ensure that banks deliver fair outcomes to customers. This will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter Three below.  
 
At the request of the NT, the World Bank Group (WBG) has provided technical assistance to 
undertake a Retail Banking Diagnostic focusing on the provision of customer transactional 
accounts and fixed deposits by retail banks in South Africa. In relation to the CBP, the WBG 
observed that while the CBP remains a key document governing and influencing bank practices, 
many gaps and inconsistencies have been identified in the code. Another important observation 
made about the CBP is its popularity within the banking industry. One author19 has shown the need 
for the CBP to be made known to customers as it would not be sufficient if only banks are aware 
of the usage.20 The WBG also recommends that efforts should be made to enhance customer 
awareness of the CBP.21 All of these shortcomings within the current CBP illustrate a need for the 
new market conduct regulator to be more intense and intrusive towards banks. 
                                                          
14 Banking Association South Africa “Code of Banking Practice” 2012 
    (https://www.banking.org.za/docs/default-source/default-document-library/code-of-banking-practice-   
2012.pdf?sfvrsn=10 (06-05-2019)). 
15 Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 1. 
16 Schulze “The South African Banking Adjudicator - A Brief Overview” 2000 SA Merc L.J 38 40.  
17 Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 1. 
18 Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 3. 
19 Du Toit “Reflections on the South African Code of Banking Practice” 2014 TSAR 568 571. 
20 Du Toit (n 19) 571. 
21 World Banking Group “Retail Banking Diagnostic” 115 
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1.3 Research question 
This dissertation will endeavour to provide solutions to the question about the future of banks in 
South Africa in light of the market conduct regulation within the banking industry. To this end, 
two problems will be investigated; firstly, whether the CBP in its current form will play a role 
under the Twin Peaks model, in particular, market conduct, and secondly, the enforceability and 
the legal status of the CBP will be evaluated in the context of achieving fair customer outcomes. 
 
This dissertation will discuss key areas in which banks have failed to voluntarily achieve fair 
customer outcomes. In this dissertation, an assessment will be conducted on whether the CBP 
achieves its objectives in terms of ensuring that there is a fair and open relationship between banks 
and customers. Furthermore, the role and importance of the CBP under the Twin Peaks model will 
be assessed with reference to specific instances. 
 
1.4 Research methodology and chapter outline 
In order for this study to provide answers to the research question, the dissertation has been 
structured as follows: 
 
Chapter One provides a brief introduction to the research problem and structure of the dissertation. 
Chapter Two contextualises the market conduct regulator within the Twin Peaks model of 
regulation in South Africa. The legislative powers and the mandate of the FSCA will also be 
explored. The new mandate of the FSCA necessitates a need to review the role of the National 
NCR under the Twin Peaks model and to that end, a brief summary of the role of the NCR will be 
discussed. The overlap between the FSCA and NCR will further be examined.  
 
Chapter Three focuses on the banks and their compliance with the TCF principles in light of 
Conduct Standard. In this chapter, a cursory view of the challenges and successes of the CBP will 
be discussed in the context of the TCF principles. The role of the Ombudsman for Banking 
Services (OBS) in enforcing the CBP will be explored in detail. This chapter will discuss gaps and 
                                                          
     (http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/SA%20Retail%20Banking%20Diagnostic%20Report.pdf (06-05- 
2019)). 
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inconsistencies within the CBP in the context of market conduct. Furthermore, some of the key 
findings made by the WBG in relation to the CBP will be analysed. 
 
Chapter Four will provide a comparative analysis of the CBP of Australia and South Africa, in the 
context of the Twin Peaks model and fair treatment of customers. Finally, Chapter Five will present 
some proposed initiatives that banks will be expected to implement to ensure that fair outcomes 
are achieved. Recommendations and concluding remarks will also be provided in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF THE MARKET CONDUCT REGULATOR 
   
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the role of the FSCA under the Twin Peaks model of regulation. The 
dissertation primarily focuses on the legislative powers of the FSCA to develop Conduct Standard 
in respect of financial institutions,22 with specific reference to banks. The jurisdictional overlap 
between the FSCA and the NCR will be explored against the backdrop of the Twin Peaks reform. 
Lastly, the powers of the FSCA to enforce the future Conduct Standard will be considered briefly. 
 
2.2 Market conduct under the Twin Peaks model of regulation 
The Twin Peaks model was originally introduced to address a challenge that was evident in the 
United Kingdom (UK), which was caused by a large number of regulators of financial products, 
which in turn left customers confused as to whom to approach.23 To this end, a proposal was made 
to create a dedicated regulator whose purpose would be to protect consumers and deter market 
misconduct.24 Both internationally and in South Africa, the Twin Peaks model of regulation is 
characterised by separation of two regulatory functions.25 The model was first adopted in Australia 
in 1997 and subsequently in the Netherlands, Belgium, New Zealand, the UK and South Africa.26  
 
Within the South African context, market conduct regulation recognises that ordinary consumer 
protection laws do not go far enough when dealing with the financial sector, which needs much 
higher and more tailored standards than generic legislation.27 This required a dedicated market 
conduct regulator to be established which would be responsible for regulating and supervising the 
market conduct of financial services, including banks, insurers and broader financial markets.28  
 
                                                          
22  (n 6) s 106(1)(d). 
23  National Treasury (n 3) 3. 
24  Schmulow (n 12) 163. 
25  Millard “Treating customers fairly: a new name for existing principles?” 2016 THRHR 596 598. 
26  Schmulow (n 12) 163. 
27  National Treasury (n 11) 18. 
28  De Jager “The South African Reserve Bank: blowing winds of change (Part 2)” 2013 SA Merc LJ 492 508. 
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2.3 The role of the FSCA towards banks 
The previous FSB was established in terms of the Financial Services Board Act (FSB Act).29 The 
preamble to the FSB Act stated that the primary function of the then FSB was to regulate and 
supervise the activities of non-banking financial institutions and the provision of financial services.  
 
In order to implement the G-20 resolutions, the South African government adopted the proposal 
to strengthen the financial regulatory system through the NT. As with many other countries,30 
South Africa had to respond to the 2008 GFC by adopting the Twin Peaks model of regulation. 
The South African government made a commitment to join an international community in 
implementing financial regulatory reform aimed at strengthening financial stability.31 A number 
of proposals were made, however, this dissertation only concentrates on the fourth proposal which 
is to “strengthen market conduct supervision and the ombudsman system, and expand the scope of 
the former FSB to cover market conduct in banking sector”.32 In order to give effect to the 
proposal, the FSR Act was enacted into law in August 2017. The FSR Act established the newly 
formed FSCA and repealed the then FSB Act.33 In terms of the FSR Act, one of the key objectives 
of the market conduct regulator is to protect financial customers by promoting fair treatment of 
financial customers by financial institutions.34 In order to give effect to the aforementioned 
objective, the FSR Act empowered the FSCA to make a wide range of Conduct Standard. The 
FSCA may develop Conduct Standard for banks as financial institutions relating to the 
requirements for fair treatment of financial customers.35 This  
 
2.4 NCR under the Twin Peaks model 
There is no doubt that the NCR has a role to play in promoting the fair treatment of financial 
customers by banks. In the wake of the Twin Peaks model of regulation, this dissertation briefly 
examines the role of the NCR in relation to retail banks. The FSR Act acknowledges the 
                                                          
29  97 of 1990. 
30  National Treasury (n 3) 29. 
31  De Jager (n 28) 508. 
32  National Treasury (n 3) 32. 
33  (n 6) s 290. 
34  (n 6) s 57(b)(i). 
35  (n 6) s 106(3)(c). 
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jurisdiction overlap between the FSCA and the NCR. In terms of the Act, Conduct Standard in 
relation to retail banks may only be made after consultation with the NCR.36 The two regulators 
will have to work closely with each other in order to mitigate risks of regulatory arbitrage which 
pre-existed the Twin Peaks model. Pursuant to the FSR Act,37 the FSCA and the NCR signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)38 in order to enable both regulators to reach a common 
understanding on areas where their respective regulatory and supervisory objectives and 
responsibilities may overlap.39 
 
While it is not the main objective of this dissertation to establish the significance of the NCR under 
the Twin Peaks model, it remains crucial to provide some analysis of the role of the NCR towards 
banks. Schmulow40 makes the following argument in support of the NCR’s contribution to the 
Twin Peaks model of regulation: firstly, it is argued that the NCR should continue to fulfil a micro-
prudential regulation; it is further argued that a dedicated regulator with oversight over credit 
territory may be able to bring more focus to the task, develop a greater degree of expertise specific 
to the regulation of credit and develop a corporate culture more suited to its task.41 Despite the fact 
that the NCR will continue to supervise and regulate the credit industry, the Twin Peaks proposals 
have identified a few areas that require immediate improvement, i.e. unsecured lending and 
granting of reckless credit.42 
 
In order to achieve some of the stated objectives of the Twin Peaks model, the NCR and the FSCA 
will jointly cooperate in developing relevant Conduct Standard for banks. This dissertation 
envisages that when the Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) reviews the current CBP, 
it will be necessary to obtain inputs from both the FSCA and the NCR. This may be part of areas 
                                                          
36 (n 6) s 106(5)(a)(b). 
37 (n 6) s 26, 27, 76 &77. 
38 Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) 
(https://www.fsca.co.za/Regulatory%20Liaison/MoU_%20FSCA%20and%20NCR.pdf(5-3-2019)). 
39 Financial Sector Conduct Authority (n 38) 3. 
40 Schmulow (n 12) 166. 
41 Schmulow (n 12) 166. 
42 Schmulow (n 12) 166. 
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which require both regulators to work together to ensure that fair outcomes to customers are 
achieved.43   
 
2.5 Conduct Standard 1 of 2019 (Banks) 
For the very first time, the FSCA published the draft Conduct Standard for banks in line with the 
FSR Act.44 The Conduct Standard will apply to banks in relation to their provision of financial 
products and financial services.45 The primary purpose of the Conduct standard is to introduce 
requirements that promote the fair treatment of financial customers of banks.46 This dissertation 
reveals that the Conduct Standard will address most of the challenges that the customers are faced 
with when dealing with banks. The Conduct Standard will address the some of the inconsistencies 
and unfair practice emanating from suitability of financial services, including banking products, 
misleading advertisements, lack of proper disclosures, refusal and closure of financial products, 
termination, closure and switching of financial products. Some of the inconsistencies are discussed 
in detail in chapter 3 below.  
 
The Conduct Standard are directly linked to the TCF principles. In order to ensure that the 
customers are protected throughout the lifecycle of the financial products Conduct Standard are 
designed to follow the sequence of the TCF outcomes.  
 
The statement supporting to the draft Conduct Standard further states that all banks, mutual banks 
and cooperative banks will be required to comply with the Conduct standard. It is therefore 
concluded with certainty that the Conduct Standard will be binding on the banks. Conduct Standard 
is perceived as a turning point which will influence the entire banking industry. 
 
                                                          
43  (n 6) s 76(1)(b). 
44  Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Conduct Standard” for banks 1 of 2019 
     (https://www.fsca.co.za/Regulatory%20Frameworks/Pages/Banks.aspx (27-11-2019)). 
45  Conduct Standard (n 44) clause 2(1). 
46  Conduct Standard (n 44) clause 2(2). Also see the “Statement supporting the draft conduct standard” (n 44). 
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2.6 The influence of Conduct Standard on the CBP 
Schulze argues that the CBP is the product of various sources.47 Many of the provisions in the CBP 
simply set out the current common law or typical contractual provisions or may be derived from 
the National Credit Act or the bill of rights.48 One of the most important influences of the CBP 
will be the Conduct Standard developed under the Twin Peaks model of regulation. The FSCA 
highlighted the significance of the Conduct Standard towards achieving fair treatment of customers 
in South African.49 It is argued that the FSCA’s Conduct Standard will certainly shape and 
influence the CBP.50 The preamble to the current CBP states that “in the Code, we refer to issues 
that may be subject to specific legislation and regulation which may change from time to time and 
will take preference over the Code”.51 It is suggested that both the NCR and the FSCA should 
develop Conduct Standard in a manner that will have strong influence in the future CBP going 
forward.  
 
The Twin Peaks model afforded the FSCA with the necessary tools to embed TCF principles in 
the banking industry. While quick glances at the CBP mirrors and reflects some of the TCF 
principles, the enforceability of the CBP remains challenging. As there are very few court cases 
dealing with the CBP,52 it could be argued that South African courts do not attach much weight to 
the CBP. In Macru Farming CC v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,53 the court dismissed the 
appellant’s attempt to invoke the provisions in the CBP that required the bank to take reasonable 
steps to review the financial situation and to develop a plan to assist a customer with his financial 
difficulties54 before resorting to liquidation. Until our courts make a pronouncement on the 
enforceability of the CBP, it shall be mentioned in court without any authority.55 Du Toit opined 
that in the absence of express incorporation of the CBP in the bank-customer contract, some of the 
                                                          
47  Du Toit (n 19) 574.  
48  Du Toit (n 19) 574. 
49  Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Strategy 2018” 16 
   (https://www.fsca.co.za/Documents/FSCA_Strategy_2018pdf (07-05-2019)). 
50  Financial Sector Conduct Authority (n 49) 17. 
51  Code of Banking Practice (n 14) 3. 
52  Du Toit (n 19) 572. 
53  2008 JDR 301 (SCA) par 11.  
54  Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 8.5.  
55  Du Toit (n 19) 573. 
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provisions in the CBP could be implied as tacit terms in the bank-customer relationship.56 Where 
such a term is “necessary in the business sense to give efficacy to the contract”, Du Toit argues 
that if the parties has been asked at the time the contract was concluded, what would happen should 
the account be used for illegal purposes they would replied that it can course be closed without 
notice.57    
 
2.7 Enforcement powers of the FSCA 
Unlike the previous FSB, the FSCA has extended legislative powers to impose administrative 
penalties on financial institutions, including banks. In terms of the FSR Act, an appropriate penalty 
may be imposed on the financial institution if that institution has contravened a financial sector 
law or has contravened an enforceable undertaking accepted by the FSCA.58 The FSCA will make 
a huge contribution towards ensuring that banks deliver fair outcomes to customers. Considering 
all of the above, banks will be expected to adopt customer-centric approaches in the banking 
industry in order to avoid regulatory and reputational risks. 
 
It is submitted that the new market conduct regulator’s responsibility to regulate and supervise 
banks will contribute in determining whether the current CBP will achieve fair outcomes within 
the banking industry. It is concluded that the new market conduct regulator is well suited in 
ensuring that banks’ customers are treated fairly. It is argued that BASA will have to give due 
consideration to the FSCA’s position in respect of advocating for the protection of customers in 
the banking industry. This dissertation submits that the new regulatory architecture bestowing 
powers on the market conduct regulator to develop Conduct Standard should be welcomed. The 
FSCA is ideally positioned to provide inputs in the current and the future CBP and also to embed 
the fair treatment outcomes approach in the banking sector.                
      
                                                          
56  Du Toit (n 19) 574. 
57  Du Toit (n 19) 574. 
58  (n 6) s 167(1)(a)(b). 
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CHAPTER THREE: CODE OF BANKING PRACTICE AND TREATING CUSTOMERS 
FAIRLY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Financial customers are not adequately protected in South Africa and more needs to be done to 
ensure that the providers of financial products and services treat their customers fairly.59 Before 
reflecting on the banks’ conduct towards customers, it is imperative to provide a brief historical 
background of the TCF principles and their introduction within the financial sector industry in 
South Africa. The introduction of the TCF principles in the banking industry will be discussed with 
reference to specific instances. In light of the Twin Peaks reform, a number of areas have been 
identified wherein banks have been found to be wanting in terms of treating customers fairly. It is, 
therefore, necessary to do a closer examination of the provisions of the CBP against the backdrop 
of the market conduct regulations. Lastly, the role of the OBS will be discussed with reference to 
treating customers fairly. 
 
3.2 Introduction of the TCF principles 
The law of South Africa is identical with English law in most matters regarding banking.60 Schulze 
states that South Africa should have regard to global trends in banking including English banking 
law.61 To this date, South Africa continues to be shaped by English banking law.  
 
The TCF principles were initially introduced in the UK through the Financial Services and Market 
Act, 2000 (FSM Act).62 The FSM Act has the following objectives, namely market confidence; 
public awareness; the protection of consumers and reduction of financial crimes.63 In 2011, South 
Africa adopted and published TCF: The Roadmap.64 The purpose of the document was to ensure 
                                                          
59  National Treasury (n 11) 6.  
60  Morice “The law of banking in South African” 1904 SALJ 355. 
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62  Millard (n 25) 596. 
63  FSM Act Part I. 
64  Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Treating Customers Fairly: The Roadmap”    
(https://www.fsca.co.za/Regulatory%20Frameworks/Documents%20for%20Consultation/Treating%20Customer
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that fair treatment of customers is embedded within the culture of financial firms,65 amongst others. 
The TCF has been described as a regulatory approach that seeks to ensure that specific, clearly 
articulated fairness outcomes for financial services customers are demonstrably delivered by 
regulated institutions.66 The Roadmap introduced the following six fairness outcomes: 
  
 “Outcome 1: Customers are confident that they are dealing with firms where the fair 
treatment of customers is central to the firm’s culture. 
 Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed to 
meet the needs of identified customer groups and are targeted accordingly. 
 Outcome 3: Customers are given clear information and are kept appropriately informed 
before, during and after the time of contracting. 
 Outcome 4: Where customers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes account of 
their circumstances. 
 Outcome 5: Customers are provided with products that perform as firms have led them to 
expect, and the associated service is both of an acceptable standard and what they have 
been led to expect. 
 Outcome 6: Customers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers to change products, 
switch providers, submit a claim or make a complaint.”67 
 
TCF can be seen as an important instrument in the Twin Peaks system.68 While the TCF principles 
have been in existence for many years in the South African financial sector industry, the principles 
have not been consistently applied by banks. Currently, the TCF principles are being applied 
largely in the insurance industry. This is based on some of the regulatory instruments that have 
already embedded the TCF principles, i.e. the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
(FAIS Act)69 including its subordinate legislation, the General Code of Conduct (GCC)70 and the 
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69  37 of 2002. 
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Policyholder Protection Rules (PPRs).71 Despite the fact that banks have been aware of the TCF 
principles, it could be argued that very little effort has been made to adequately embed the 
principles in the banking industry. Further, it could be argued that some of the reasons why banks 
are falling behind in terms of applying the TCF principles within banking sector could be due to 
the absence of a dedicated conduct regulator to enforce compliance with the principles, and 
secondly the NCR’s inability to measure compliance with the TCF principles in their supervision 
of banks. Due to some of the significant changes that are brought by the market conduct regime it 
worthwhile to make an analysis of the CBP under the new regulatory approach.  
 
3.3 CBP under the market conduct regime 
The CBP remains an important instrument in the banking industry.72 It applies to personal 
customers and small businesses.73 While almost all the retail banks are members of BASA, the 
preamble to the CBP states that it is a voluntary code which the banks may abide by, should they 
elect to do so. The wording of the preamble proposes that banks may choose when to comply with 
the CBP. This raises a question about the extent to which banks abide by the CBP. There is a 
proposition that banks may, on occasion, depart from the CBP.74 It could be argued that this 
contributes towards lack of consistency in delivering fair outcomes to customers within the 
banking industry. 
 
There have been instances where the CBP in its current form has been found to be wanting in terms 
of ensuring that banks treat their customers fairly and consistently across the banking sector. 
Firstly, in respect of set-off,75 the CBP provides that during activation of an account a bank “will 
provide you with information that will include clear and prominent notice of any rights of set-off 
                                                          
71  Policyholder Protection Rules (both issued under the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and Short-Term 
Insurance Act 53 of 1998 respectively) 2017. 
72   Schulze (n 16) 40. 
73   Code of Banking Practice (n 13) clause 12. Small business is defined as “an association of natural or legal persons 
incorporated in or outside the Republic of South Africa, which has legal personality or enjoys a similar status in 
terms of which it may enter into contractual relations and legal proceedings in its own name and whose turnover 
for the last financial year was less than R5 million”. 
74   Du Toit (n 19) 571. 
75   Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 7.5. 
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that the bank may claim over credit and debit balances in different accounts”.76 This has 
contributed towards some inconsistency in the banking industry as different banks apply the clause 
differently to the detriment of the customers. Academic writers have also highlighted that the 
bank’s right to combine accounts without notice to the customer can create problems for the 
customers.77  
 
3.3.1 Set-off within banking industry  
Set-off is an old and well-known principle78 and there are numerous case laws dealing with this 
principle in South Africa. Traditionally, the common-law set-off involves the discharge of mutual 
debts between two people.79 The practice affords banks privileges not available to a customer's 
other creditors.80 In English law, the practice is known as a combination of accounts.81 In the 
context of banks, set-off becomes relevant when the customer has two or more accounts at the 
same bank. In summary, the requirements for set-off has been codified as follows: the debt must 
exist mutually between the same people; the debt must be of the same nature; both debts must be 
due and enforceable, and both debts must be liquidated.82 The common law requirements for 
successful reliance on set-off may fall short of the TCF principles. In National Credit Regulator v 
Standard Bank Ltd,83 the court had to decide whether the common-law right of set-off is 
inapplicable in respect of credit agreements that are subject to the NCA.84 Among others, Standard 
Bank Ltd argued that the common-law set-off is crucial tool in banking industry,85 as it is part of 
the risk factored in the granting of credit to the debtor in the first place. It is argued that banks 
consider its ability to apply common-law set-off as a form of security. Banks submit that 
prohibition of common-law set-off to credit agreements would increase the cost of providing credit 
                                                          
76 Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 7.5. 
77 Nagel and Pretorius “The bank and customer relationship, combination of accounts and set-off” 2016 THRHR 660 
669. 
78 Pretorius “Combining bank accounts” 2008 JBL 51 53. 
79 Nagel and Pretorius (n 77) 668. 
80 Cranston, Avgouleas, and Zwieten Principles of Banking Law (3rd ed) 225.  
81 Pretorius (n 73) 51. 
82 Nagel and Pretorius (n 77) 665. 
83 2019 ZAGPJHC 182. 
84 (n 83) par 1. 
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to costumers.86 It is submitted that the NCR’s decision to seek a declaratory order should be 
celebrated as a step in the right direction towards ensuring protection of customers against 
unscrupulous banks. It is respectfully submitted that in order for the CBP to continue to be relevant, 
it should be reviewed in light of the decision in Standard Bank Ltd. It is argued that the bank’s 
right to apply set-off should further be defined in order to protect customers. The court made a 
distinction between common-law set-off and the statutory set-off under the NCA. In its submission 
the bank argued that the common-law set-off is still applicable despite the provision of section 
90(2)(n) read with section 124. The court dismissed the bank’s argument and opined that the 
statutory set-off represent a complete break from the application of the common-law principles of 
set-off.87 The court reaffirmed the importance of section 124 of the NCA and held that statutory 
set-off aimed at ensuring fair treatment of customers. The customer who owes a credit provider 
must have a say in and authorise, whether and how set-off is to be applied.88 The court went further 
to state that the statutory set-off require the consent of the customer before it can be effected.89 
 
3.3.2 Closure of bank accounts   
Secondly, in terms of the CBP, banks are entitled to close bank accounts without providing a 
customer with prior notice under certain circumstances.90 It is important to briefly make an 
assessment of the OBS’s perspective on the closure of bank accounts. While there are plentiful 
problematic and systemic areas that have been identified by the OBS regarding the banks’ conduct, 
this dissertation seeks to discuss the OBS’s view on the closure of bank accounts and whether that 
view is consistent with the TCF principles. 
 
In a bulletin,91 the OBS highlighted its stance and recommendations on how banks should handle 
the closing of bank accounts. As a starting point, the CBP states that “we will not close your 
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90  Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 7.3. 
91  Ombudsman for Banking Services “Bulletin 3 – Closure of banks accounts” 
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account without giving you reasonable prior notice at the last contact details that you gave us,”92 
but from a TCF perspective this is not sufficient to ensure that fair outcomes are achieved. The 
OBS deemed it important to interpret the provision in order to ensure fairness and good banking 
practice. In its interpretation, the OBS indicated that it is insufficient to warn a customer that the 
account may be closed and in the spirit of treating customers fairly the OBS went further to state 
that the notice must be in writing and be sent by registered mail in order to ensure that there is 
sufficient evidence of the notice having been sent within a reasonable period prior to the actual 
closure.93 Furthermore, the OBS stated that what would constitute a reasonable period would be 
considered on an individual case basis. Considering the OBS’s assertiveness in this specific 
bulletin, it could be argued that the OBS’s approach is not far from ensuring fair treatment of 
customers in the banking industry. It is further argued that while fairness does not automatically 
permit the law or good practice to be disregarded, it allows the OBS to take into account 
consideration of equity when applying strict legal principles.94 
 
3.3.2.1 South African courts decisions on the closure of bank accounts  
The South African courts had opportunities to reflect on bank’s right to unilaterally terminate a 
contract with a customer and close bank accounts. While the court decisions do not make a direct 
mention of the CBP, undoubtedly they have an impact on the code. This dissertation makes an 
assessment of the recent court decisions against the backdrop of the market conduct regime. 
 
The case of Bredenkamp v Standard Bank SA95 is regarded as the leading case on the unilateral 
termination by a bank of its customers.96 The court had to decide whether a bank has the right to 
cancel the contract with the customers. Mr Bredenkamp held bank accounts at Standard Bank. 
Following the American Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) 
decision to list Mr Bredenkamp and others as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), Mr 
                                                          
92  Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 7.3.2.  
93  Ombudsman for Banking Services (n 91) 6. 
94  Schulze (n 16) 48. 
95  2010 All SA 468 (SCA). 
96  Narotzky Unilateral termination of the bank-client contract by the bank (2018 dissertation UJ) 12. 
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Bredenkamp became subject to the sanctions imposed and enforced by OFAC.97 As a result of the 
listing, Standard Bank decided to terminate the relationship with Mr Bredenkamp and close bank 
accounts which Mr Bredenkamp had with Standard Bank. The bank did not initially inform Mr 
Bredenkamp of its reasons for termination.98 In Bredenkamp the court confirmed the bank has a 
right to cancel the contract and close the account, however consideration was also given to the 
fairness of the reasons and the procedure to terminate bank-customer relationship.99 In 
Bredenkamp, the court acknowledged the multi-faceted responsibility of a bank when interacting 
with customers.100 The court confirmed the bank’s right to close the bank accounts without prior 
notice, only in the circumstances where the bank is obliged to do so by law or international best 
practice.101 The court further held that the OFAC listing entitled Standard Bank to close the bank 
accounts.102 It is submitted that while Bredenkamp set the tone for the future in respect of a bank’s 
rights to close bank accounts, the interesting question is whether fear of reputational risk alone 
without any cogent reasons will withstand judicial scrutiny in the future. 
 
In the case of Annex Distribution Pty Ltd v Bank of Baroda103 the applicants brought an application 
for an interdict that would prohibit the respondent from de-activating and closing their bank 
accounts.104 The applicants further sought the court to make determination regarding reasonable 
notice period to de-activate bank accounts and terminate bank-customer relationship. The court 
indicated that a contractual clause which permits a bank a right to vary terms and conditions 
without giving notice would potentially be against public policy and unenforceable.105 The Bank 
of Baroda concurred with Bredenkamp in terms of a bank’s right to terminate a bank-customer 
relationship. In Bank of Baroda court further held that in the absence of an express termination 
clause, a bank must terminate on a reasonable notice.106 Schulze is also of the view that indefinite 
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contracts may be terminated with reasonable notice.107 While Bank of Baroda held that a bank has 
no obligation to furnish reasons for terminating the relationship, Schulze is of the view that in 
order to ensure that customers are not unfairly prejudiced by the bank’s decision to close bank 
accounts, they should inform a customer of the reasons for exercising the right.108 In support of a 
dissenting view it is argued that the absence of reasons could be seen as an absence of good faith 
or an abuse of contractual rights by the bank.109 
 
In the case of Hlongwane v ABSA Bank Ltd,110 the applicants were holders of bank accounts with 
ABSA Bank. ABSA Bank informed the applicant that a decision had been taken to close their bank 
accounts as a result of a review of its bank’s business.111 As a result, the applicants approached the 
OBS and argued that ABSA’s decision to close the bank accounts was based on the applicant’s 
political affiliation and infringed on their rights under the Constitution.112 In its determination, the 
OBS cleared ABSA of any maladministration.113 Despite the fact that in Hlongwane case the court 
dismissed the applicant’s bid to recover all information sought from ABSA Bank, it is crucial to 
note the applicant’s argument. It has been argued that the reasons for closing of bank accounts 
could be important in two respects. Firstly, for the purpose of receiving legal advice as to whether 
to institute action against a bank which potentially could include a declaratory order that a bank’s 
decision to close the account constitutes unlawful and unconstitutional conduct.114 Secondly, the 
provision of reasons will further aide in determining whether there is breach of contract and 
whether to compel a bank to reopen the accounts.115 It is submitted that the Hlongwane case 
represents honest circumstances where a bank’s right to close bank accounts is compelled by law. 
The customer was classified as a “Politically Exposed Person” (PEP).116 The court acknowledged 
that the bank will be required to employ additional resources if a decision were to be made to retain 
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the customer. It is submitted that the bank’s decision in this specific circumstance is reasonably 
justified. 
 
The court judgments from all aforementioned cases confirms that generally a bank has a right to 
close bank account and terminate a bank-customer relationship. In the context of achieving fairness 
courts have gone further to conclude that banks should provide notice before closing bank 
accounts. It is submitted that the courts’ approach in this regard is consistent with market conduct 
regime. The Conduct Standard proposes that banks must document, adopt and implement process 
and procedures relating to withdrawal, termination or closure of a financial product or service 
taking into consideration relevant international standards and best practices.117  
 
It is submitted that the market conduct regime is close to bringing certainty in as far as the 
obligations of banks are concerned. This dissertation submits that banks will not be able to rely on 
the CBP when deciding whether to provide prior notice and reasons for closing bank accounts. 
There are some similarities between the CBP and the Conduct Standard in respect of the 
circumstances under which a bank is entitled to close bank accounts without a prior notice. 
However, the Conduct Standard proposes to make it mandatory for banks to provide prior notice 
and reasons for the termination.118 While the Conduct Standard will allow banks to close banks 
accounts, one of the similarities between the CBP and the Conduct Standard is that banks retain a 
right to close accounts and not provide reasons under certain circumstances.119 It is submitted that 
circumstances should be careful defined to ensure that banks do not abuse their right. Schulze 
argue that banks must ensure that their decision to close bank accounts or to terminate the contract 
does not cause the customer to become unbanked, even if it is temporary, unless there are 
compelling reasons.120 It is submitted that what would constitute a compelling reason need to be 
defined by our courts.121 
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3.4 The WBG and the gaps in the CBP 
It can be argued that Retail Banking Diagnostic122 reports can be perceived as a game changer as 
far as market conduct regime is concerned in the banking industry. The report is important in two 
respects: firstly, the report came at a time when a dedicated market conduct regulator for financial 
institutions has just been established, and secondly the recommendations in the report are directly 
linked to TCF principles. Therefore, this dissertation aims to discuss some of the inconsistencies 
and gaps found by the WBG relating to the CBP and suggest possible solutions. 
 
3.4.1 Disclosures 
While the CBP states that banks are required to make full and detailed disclosures to customers 
about terms, conditions, products and services,123 very little, if anything, has been done by banks 
to realise the expectation of the CBP in this regard. The WBG found that due to lack of legal and 
regulatory framework124 various banks have adopted different ways to meet the disclosure 
requirement and this has resulted in some inconsistencies in practice in the banking industry. This 
practice is incompatible with the TCF Outcome 2, which states that customers should be given 
clear information and be kept appropriately informed before, during and after the time of 
contracting.125 Generally, the CBP places the onus on the customers to request information, the 
WBG indicated that there is a significant need to revise and strengthen the CBP’s approach to 
disclosure. 
 
3.4.2 Fees and charges 
Closely linked to disclosure is the unilateral changing of terms and conditions and fees and charges. 
The WBG found that some banks’ terms and conditions contain clauses stating that a bank can 
change the fees and charges and other terms and conditions for an account without prior individual 
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notice being provided to the customers.126 There is no doubt that this practice falls short of TCF 
Outcome 2 in terms of delivering fair customer outcomes.127 Despite clause 4.8 of the CBP (which 
states that unless longer periods are specified by applicable regulation, customers will be informed 
20 business days before any changes are implemented)128 there are some findings that not all banks 
comply with such a clause. The WBG found that two of the big banks’ terms and conditions state 
that they are entitled to change fees, costs, interest rates, and charges at their discretion.129 It is 
recommended that the market conduct regulation should mandate minimum notice periods and 
require individual customer notices of change.130 
 
3.4.3 Switching of bank accounts 
It is generally assumed that there is no switching of bank accounts in South Africa. Switching of 
bank account could be described as a process of moving bank account from one bank to the other. 
It is argued that bank fees and charges are the drivers of switching of bank accounts. The WBG 
has identified shortcomings in terms of the switching of accounts in the South African banking 
industry; this is despite the provisions in the CBP which highlight banks’ commitment to making 
it as seamless and easy as possible and reasonable for all personal transaction account customers 
to switch banks.131 
 
The WBG has found that not all banks have clear and transparent switching processes in place.               
Customers are often faced with an enormous administrative burden when switching accounts. It 
can be argued that the FSCA through Conduct Standard will have to ensure that the switching 
rights and process form part of the contractual disclosure. The Conduct Standard states that bank 
must assist a financial customer to transfer to another bank a financial product or financial service, 
on receiving a request from a financial customer to do so.132 It has been recommended that 
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awareness of switching related services should be ensured through appropriate information 
available in branches and other distribution channels.133 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
In light of the new regulatory powers bestowed on the market conduct regulator, it is submitted 
that banks will be enjoined to embed fair treatment when interacting with customers on various 
fronts. This dissertation submits that the CBP in its current form has failed to bring about customer 
protection, in respects of set-off, closing of bank accounts, disclosures, fees and charges and 
switching of bank accounts. Based on the aforementioned instances it is argued that the CBP will 
be rendered obsolete to the extent that the Conduct Standard become effective. Alternatively, the 
CBP will have to be reviewed in light of the new market conduct regime, particularly gearing 
towards fair treatment of customers. In order to remain relevance, the CBP may further take into 
account what other jurisdictions have done to ensure that their codes remain relevant under market 
conduct regime.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CODES OF BANKING 
PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA 
  
4.1 Importance of foreign banking law in South Africa  
Schulze states that Australia’s banking law is important as an example of a legal system which 
was originally modelled on the English common-law system but which has since been the subject 
of intense and innovative reform.134 The relevance further lies in the fact that both South African 
and Australian banking law have their roots in English banking law.135 Australian banking law 
constitutes an important part of modern banking law in the context of the Twin Peaks model; 
firstly, Australia is one of the first countries to implement the Twin Peaks model successfully 136 
and secondly, the Australian CBP has been in existence longer than the South African CBP. The 
Australian banking ombudsman scheme was first established in 1989.137 This implies that there 
are some lessons to be learned from the Australian CBP and ombudsman scheme with respect to 
the customer-centric approach. 
 
Australia’s first CBP came into effect in 1996.138 The code contains a provision that it should be 
reviewed every three years.139 The second code was reviewed and launched in August 2002. The 
latest code came into effect in July 2019.140 The current code has undergone multiple reviews and 
improvements in order to remain relevant.141  
 
As a result of the similarities that will be explored below in this chapter between the South African 
and the Australian CBP, it is submitted that there are some lessons to be learned in respect of the 
customer-centric approach. Both the Australian CBP and OBS may be consulted fruitfully in light 
of the market conduct regime. This will further provide much required guidance when the South 
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African CBP is reviewed. In terms of the CBP, BASA has the responsibilities to monitor and 
review the code periodically.142 The current South African code came into effect in 2012.143  
 
4.2 Dissection of the Australian CBP   
Unless the context indicates otherwise, any reference to the Australian CBP refers to the code 
which came into effect in July 2019. The Australian CBP, like the South African CBP, is applicable 
to individual customers and small business.144  
  
 4.2.1 Binding nature of the Australian CBP 
Unlike the South African CBP, the Australian CBP clearly stipulates that the provisions of said 
code bind banks.145 The South African CBP only makes reference to the fact that banks will abide 
by the recommendations of the OBS when interpreting the code. The Australian CBP imposes 
higher standards on banks. If the code imposes obligation in addition to that obligation applying 
under the relevant law, the bank then will have to comply with the code unless doing so will lead 
to a breach of the law.146 This is different from the South African CBP, which states that the CBP 
is subject to specific legislation and regulation that will take preference over the code. 147 It may 
well be argued that the South African CBP in its current form is not legally binding. 
                                                      
 4.2.2 Training of banks’ employees 
The Australian CBP has a dedicated chapter dealing with training and competency of staff within 
banks.148 The code specifically highlights the need for staff to understand and comply with the 
code when rendering banking services to customers.149 Unlike the Australian CBP, the South 
African CBP in limited words provides that staff will be trained to provide friendly and efficient 
service. This dissertation recommends that similar obligation be imposed on South African banks. 
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It is argued without qualm that banking customers may directly derive knowledge from well-
trained banks personals. This will eventually raise public awareness of the CBP150 and help 
customers understands their rights and obligations. 
 
 4.2.3 Financial inclusion and accessible banking  
Unlike the South African CBP, the Australian CBP recognises the importance of financially 
inclusive and accessible banking. The code provides banking services for customer with a low 
income.151 The codes states that “if you are an individual and you tell us that you are a low-income 
earner, we will give you (a) information about accounts that may be appropriate to your needs and 
(b) information about our accounts (i) for which standard fees and charges are low or (ii) for which 
there are no fees and charges”.152 This is important in the context of achieving fair customer 
outcomes. Owing to South Africa’s demographics, which are often characterised by financially ill-
educated and illiterate customers,153 such a clause dealing with low-income earners would be 
significant. Both the South African and Australian CBP provide banks with a right to apply set-
off. While both codes permit banks to keep the funds pending a discussion with the customers 
under certain circumstances, the Australian CBP encourages banks to consider the customer’s 
financial situation prior to exercising their right to apply set-off.154 It would be a step in the right 
direction for South African CBP to adopt similar approach. This will ensure that the CBP remains 
relevant in light of market conduct regime. 
 
 4.2.4 Compliance monitoring: Banking Code Compliance Committee  
In an attempt to reinforce compliance, the Australian CBP has established the Banking Code 
Compliance Committee (BCCC), an independent body whose role is to monitor and oversee 
compliance with the code.155 The most notable sanction that may be imposed by the BCCC after 
considering the seriousness of the breach of the code is to report non-compliant banks to the 
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Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) which is the financial services and 
consumer credit regulator.156 Lack of similar arrangement in South African CBP may suggest that 
there is a gap in this regard. In terms of South Africa’s current regulatory architecture, the OBS is 
not legally obliged to report any non-compliance with the CBP to the FSCA. It is submitted that 
the disconnect between the OBS and the FSCA in terms of enforcing compliance could be 
perceived as a weakness in the system. In order to ensure maximum protection to the customers, 
BASA should take some lessons from the Australian jurisdiction in this regard.  
 
4.3 The OBS: Australian and South African perspective  
Schulze states that the Australian OBS constitutes an important comparative knowledge and 
expertise for other jurisdictions, including South Africa.157 The Australian OBS is further regarded 
as an example of a developed and proven158 banking ombudsman scheme. 
 
The preamble to the South African CBP acknowledges the role of the OBS by stating that:159 
 
“We accept the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman for Banking Services to mediate, to 
make binding determinations based on this Code and on the law where appropriate, 
and to make recommendations in other circumstances including those based on 
equity. A determination made by the Ombudsman for Banking Services may be 
made an order of the court. If we refuse to abide by a recommendation of the 
Ombudsman for Banking Services, the Ombudsman may publish the 
recommendation and the relevant bank’s refusal to comply.” 
 
The OBS was first established in 1997.160 The Office of the OBS exists to provide individual and 
small business banking customers with a fair, quick and accessible dispute resolution process 
which is free of charge.161 In terms of its powers and duties, the OBS may identify any systemic 
                                                          
156 Australian Banking Association (n 139) clause 215. 
157 Schulze (n 16) 44. 
158 Schulze (n 16) 44. 
159 Code of Banking Practice (n 14) clause 1. 
160 Melville “Has ombudsmania reached South Africa? The burgeoning role of ombudsmen in commercial dispute 
resolution” 2010 SA Merc LJ 50.  
161 Ombudsman for Banking services “Introduction to the Ombudsman for Banking Services Terms of Reference” 
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problems pertaining to a bank (or the banking industry generally), conduct research and formulate 
proposals for the rectification of the problems162 and issue bulletins or other information notes 
regarding banking practice. In the context of ensuring fair treatment of customers, this implies that 
the OBS may recommend that banks should desist from certain conduct.  
 
While the OBS is neither a judge nor a court of law,163 it is argued that banks are expected to 
implement the recommendations of the OBS. This invites a question as to whether the 
determinations of the OBS are truly binding on the banks. While it is not the main focus of this 
dissertation to investigate the binding nature of the determinations of the OBS, it may be important 
to mention that this aspect is important in light of achieving fair customer outcomes. This 
dissertation argues that until the last word is spoken on whether the determinations are genuinely 
binding on the banks, the banks will implement the recommendations of the OBS selectively. 
South Africa should have consider adopting the Australian approach in terms of how an 
independent body like BCCC can effectively enforce the CBP.  
 
Similar to South African CBP, the previous Australian CBP has always being consulted by the 
Australian OBS as a good banking practice.164 Schulze argued that what constitutes good banking 
practice may be ascertained from the banking industry.165 In order to ensure seamless dispute 
resolution and to provide the OBS with an effective mechanism to achieve fair outcomes, the CBP 
should explicitly be regarded as a naturalia of the bank-customer relationship. Simply put, if the 
CBP were to survive under the market conduct regime it should at least have a contractual effect 
by means of incorporation into the terms and conditions of different banking services.166 Du Toit’s 
proposition above is more relevant now than it was before. In light of the customer-centric 
approach, it may be worthwhile to dictate that certain provisions be incorporated into bank-
                                                          
(https://www.obssa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Terms-of-Reference-Final-February-2018.pdf (23-04- 
2019)). 
162 Ombudsman for Banking Services “Terms of reference” 1.3 
(https://www.obssa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Terms-of-Reference-Final-February-2018.pdf (13-05- 
2019)). See also The Ombudsman for Banking Services Handbook (2013) 17. 
163  Schulze (n 16) 48. 
164  Schulze (n 16) 49. 
165  Du Toit (n 19) 569. 
166  Schulze (n 16) 47. 
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customer relationship. It is therefore submitted that South Africa may benefit greatly from the 
Australian CBP and the approach adopted in order to achieve fair outcomes in the banking 
industry. 
 
This dissertation argues that to the extent that the CBP remains relevant it should be incorporated 
into the bank-customer relationship. This will enable customers to enforce their rights in the event 
of breach of contract by a bank. The Conduct Standard should make it mandatory for banks to 
incorporate certain terms and conditions into the bank-customer contract. This dissertation argues 
further that incorporation of the CBP will override implied terms and conditions that are 
inconsistent with the Conduct Standard and good banking practice. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this dissertation was to make an assessment of the relevance of the CBP in the 
wake of the market conduct regime in South Africa. Notwithstanding the argument that the CBP 
is an important instrument in the banking industry in South African,167 there has been development 
within the financial sector industry which threatens the relevance of the code. The adoption of the 
Twin Peaks model, which brought about the market conduct regime, paved a way for the TCF 
principles in the banking industry. While Millard argues that the TCF principles are not genuinely 
new,168 it is submitted that the principles are new in the banking industry. The TCF principles have 
been hailed for their ability to address issues relating to customer protection at all stages of the 
financial institution’s relationship with the customer.169  
 
When the TCF principles were initially introduced, they were seen as a self-regulatory initiative,170 
financial institutions were voluntarily expected to embed the principles into their organisational 
culture. The enactment of the FSR Act is to be regarded as an important phase towards the 
introduction of the TCF principles into law. This implies that compliance with the TCF principles 
will extended to all financial institutions, including banks. 
 
What follows is a summary of some of the weaknesses in the CBP that have been identified by 
this dissertation in light of the market conduct regime. Recommendations are also provided.  
 
5.2 Weaknesses and recommendations 
It has been demonstrated that the practice of applying set-off in the banking industry is not without 
legal controversy. The OBS’s stance when interpreting the CBP left much to be desired. It is 
submitted that the CBP has failed to bring much required certainty to the matter. For longest time 
the matter has been left to individual banks to decide for themselves. The dissertation submits that 
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the court decision in National Credit Regulator v Standard Bank Ltd has brought about certainty 
to a large extent. The market conduct regulator should have regard to the court decision when 
developing Conduct Standard. This dissertation argues that aforementioned court decision 
demonstrates a situation where the CBP has been rendered obsolete. It is therefore concluded that 
as far as set-off is concerned the CBP should be reviewed taking into considering judicial 
pronouncements and the Conduct Standard for banks. 
  
Notwithstanding some of the deficiencies that have been discussed in paragraph 3.3.2 above in 
relation to a bank’s right to close accounts, the CBP represents current banking practice in South 
Africa.171 In terms of the court decisions discussed above, the general rule has been laid down that 
banks are entitled to close bank accounts.172 Notwithstanding the common-law position that banks 
are under no obligation to give reasons for terminating,173 it is submitted that the provision of 
reasons is important towards achieving fair outcomes. Furthermore, it is argued that a checklist of 
requirements for a bank to terminate the contract with its customers,174 as proposed by Schulze, is 
a step in the right direction. The CBP does not lay out a process to be followed when terminating 
bank-customer relationships and closing bank accounts. In summary, Schulze suggests that a bank 
should assess the reasons for its decision to close the bank accounts; notice should be given to the 
customers;175 and the decision by the bank to close or to terminate the contract does not cause the 
customer to be unbanked except if there are compelling reasons.176 It is submitted that the current 
CBP should be amended to incorporate a sound process that needs to be followed by banks when 
terminating bank-customer relationships, in particular, closing of bank accounts. 
 
In Chapter Three, the dissertation provided three instances that have been identified by the Retail 
Banking Diagnostic report for urgent regulatory intervention.177 Amongst others, the report has 
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identified lack of disclosure,178 fees and charges,179 and switching of bank accounts180 as some of 
the areas that require attention in light of the market conduct regime. It is submitted that the market 
conduct regulator should set out a detailed market framework through Conduct Standard in order 
to ensure that the TCF principles are embedded in the banking industry.  
 
The role of the OBS within the market regime cannot be overemphasised. It is submitted that the 
relevance of the CBP under the market conduct regime will hinge on the OBS’s ability to enforce 
the CBP. In order to avoid regulatory arbitrage, the OBS and market conduct regulator should 
work closely to achieve full implementation of the fair customers outcomes across the banking 
industry. The Australian jurisdiction provides a good example of a close collaboration between the 
conduct regulator (ASIC) and the BCCC, an independent body established to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the code. South African market conduct regulator should take cognisance of 
foreign jurisdiction in this regard.  
 
It has been demonstrated that the CBP is becoming less relevant in the banking industry as it relates 
to some of the aspects discussed in this dissertation. It is submitted that the current CBP should be 
reviewed and updated taking into account the TCF principles.181 Further, it will be beneficial for 
the banking industry to allow the market conduct regulator to provide inputs when the CBP is 
reviewed.  
 
Bearing all of the above in mind, in particular the Conduct Standard for banks, this dissertation 
concludes that the current CBP fall short of the expectations of the market conduct regime. This 
dissertation submits that the CBP should be revisited with a view to align it with market conduct 
regime, specifically treating customers fairly approach. In order to achieve maximum customer 
protection both the OBS and the market conduct regulator should work closely to avoid regulatory 
gaps. It is submitted that the revised CBP will pave a way for TCF to be embedded in the banking 
industry. 
 
                                                          
178  World Banking Group (n 21) 66. 
179  World Banking Group (n 21) 99. 
180  World Banking Group (n 21) 108. 
181  World Banking Group (n 21) 115. 
33 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books  
1. Cranston, Avgouleas, and Zwieten Principles of Banking Law Oxford University Press (2018) 
  
2. Ellinger E.P, Lomnicka E and Hare C Ellinger's Modern Banking Law Oxford University Press 
(2011) 
 
3. Ombudsman for Banking Services Handbook of the Ombudsman for Banking Services Juta & 
Co (2013) 
 
Legislation  
1. Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
2. Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 
3. Financial Services and Market Act, 2000 
4. Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
5. Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 
6. National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
7. Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 
Case Law 
1. Annex Distribution (Pty) Ltd and Others v Bank of Baroda (52590/2017) [2017] 
ZAGPPHC 608 
 
2. Bredenkamp v Standard Bank SA and another 2010 All SA 468 (SCA) 
 
3. Hlongwane and others v ABSA Bank Ltd and another 2016 ZAGPPHC 938 
 
4. Joint Stock Company Varvarinskoye v ABSA Bank Ltd and others 2008 All SA 130 
(SCA) 
34 
 
5. Macru Farming CC v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2008 JDR 301 (SCA) 
 
Journal articles  
1. De Jager “The South African Reserve Bank: blowing winds of change (Part 2)” 2013 SA 
Merc LJ 492 
 
2. Du Toit “Closing bank: Recent developments” 2018 Annual Banking Law Update 65 
 
3. Du Toit “Reflections on the South African Code Banking Practice” 2014 TSAR 568 
 
4. Grady “Preparing for Australia’s Tough New Banking Standards” 2002 International 
Financial Law Review 29 
 
5. Melville “Has ombudsmania reached South Africa? The burgeoning role of ombudsmen in 
commercial dispute resolution” 2010 SA Merc LJ 50 
 
6. Millard “Treating customers fairly: a new name for existing principles?” 2016 THRHR 596 
 
7. Morice “The law of banking in South African” 1904 SALJ 355 
 
8. Nagel and Pretorius “The bank and customer relationship, combination of accounts and 
set-off” 2016 THRHR 660 
 
9. Pretorius “Combining bank accounts” 2008 JBL 51 53 
 
10. Rautenbach “Cancellation clauses in bank-Customer contract and the bill of rights” 2010 
TSAR 638 
 
11. Schmulow “Retail Market conducts reforms in South Africa under Twin Peaks” 2017 Law 
and Financial Markets Review 163 
 
12. Schulze “The bank’s right to cancel the contract between it and its customer unilaterally 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA)” 2011 Obiter 21 
 
35 
 
13. Schulze “The Sources of South African Banking Law - A Twenty-first Century Perspective 
(Part I)” 2002 SA Merc LJ 438 
  
14. Schulze “The Sources of South African Banking Law - A Twenty-first Century Perspective 
(Part II)” 2002 SA Merc LJ 601 
 
15. Schulze “The South African Banking Adjudicator - A Brief Overview” 2000 SAMerc L.J 
38 
 
16. Van Niekerk and Van Heerden “Twin Peaks: the role of the South African central bank in 
promoting and maintaining financial stability” 2017 THRHR 636 
Internet sources   
1. Australian Banking Association “Banking Code of Practice” 2019 
(https://www.ausbanking.org.au/images/uploads/Banking_Code_of_Practice_2019_web.
pdf (30-04-2019)) 
 
2. Bank enquiry – Report to the Competition Commissioner by the Enquiry Panel 
(https://www.southafrica.to/Banks/news/2008/competition-commission-banking- 
enquiry.pdf (02-05-2019)) 
  
3. Banking Association South Africa “Code of Banking Practice” 2012 
(https://www.banking.org.za/docs/default-source/default-document-library/code-of-
banking-practice-   2012.pdf?sfvrsn=10 06-05-2019)) 
  
4. Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) 
(https://www.fsca.co.za/Regulatory%20Liaison/MoU_%20FSCA%20and%20NCR.pdf(5
-3-2019)) 
  
5. Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Strategy 2018” 
(https://www.fsca.co.za/Documents/FSCA_Strategy_2018pdf (07-05-2019)) 
  
6. National Treasury “A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better” 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20-
%20Item%202%20A%20safer%20financial%20sector%20to%20serve%20South%20Afr
ica%20better.pdf (02-05-2019)) 
  
7. National Treasury “Treating Customer Fairly in the Financial Sector: A Draft Market 
Conduct Policy Framework for South Africa” 8 
36 
 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20
Fairly%20in%20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Am
ended%20Jan2015%20WithAp6.pdf(19-04-2019)) 
  
8. Ombudsman for Banking services “Bulletin 3 – Closure of banks accounts” 
(https://www.obssa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Bulletin-3-Closure-of-bank-
accounts-Final- 30.01.2018.pdf (23-04-2019)) 
  
9. World Banking Group “Retail Banking Diagnostic” Treating customers fairly in relation 
to transactional accounts and fixed deposits 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/SA%20Retail%20Banking%20Diagnostic
%20Report.pdf (24-04- 2019))    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
